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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-3215
___________
JOSEPH P. MOFFITT,
Appellant
v.
PHILLIP FARR; WILLIAM WEIDNER; JOHN M. BURKE; FRANK P. GALICKI;
WILLIAM PREBOLA; HOLLY ARNOLD; ROBERT J. PARRY, III;
WILLIAM SWILLEY
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-00899)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 7, 2021
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 3, 2021)
___________
OPINION*
___________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Joseph P. Moffitt was an elementary school principal with the Tunkhannock Area
School District. In September 2016 the School District fired him for two driving-underthe-influence incidents. After losing his appeals with the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Education and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Moffitt filed this federal
lawsuit claiming violations of his constitutional rights. Because the issues he raises were
already decided by a state court and are thus barred by the issue preclusion doctrine, we
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.
I.
Moffitt received several hearings before his termination. First, the School District
held a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was represented by counsel. Moffitt v.
Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 192 A.3d 1214, 1215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018). After the
School District recommended Moffitt’s dismissal, its Board of School Directors (the
“Board”) held two evidentiary hearings where several witnesses testified in support of the
District. Id. at 1215–16; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
546 (1985) (holding public employees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to
respond before termination). The Board then voted to terminate Moffitt’s employment.
Moffit, 192 A.3d at 1216. On appeal, Moffitt fared no better. Pennsylvania’s Secretary
of Education affirmed his termination, and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the Secretary’s decision. Id. at 1216–17, 1219.
Moffitt filed suit in federal court against the School District, the Board, and
members of the Board in their individual and official capacities. The District Court
dismissed most of the first complaint with prejudice, holding that the claims against the
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District, the Board, and individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by
the claim preclusion doctrine. However, the Court allowed Moffitt to amend his
complaint against Board member defendants in their individual capacities. The amended
complaint asserts four separate counts—two counts alleging violations of Moffitt’s due
process and equal protection rights, one count for First Amendment retaliation, and one
count for wrongful suspension and termination under state law. Concluding the issue
preclusion doctrine bars Moffitt’s amended complaint, the District Court dismissed it.
Moffitt appeals to us.1
II.2
To determine the preclusive effect of a prior Pennsylvania case, we apply the same
preclusion test that a Commonwealth court would apply. Edmundson v. Borough of
Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). Pennsylvania follows well-settled
elements for applying the issue preclusion doctrine (also known as collateral estoppel),
which bars re-litigation of an issue from a previous action if:

1

Moffitt challenges only the District Court’s order dismissing his amended complaint
and does not challenge any aspect of the District Court’s decision as to his initial
complaint. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that
arguments not raised in the appellants’ opening brief were forfeited).
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties agree we exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Moffitt’s amended complaint based on issue
preclusion. However, where a “nonparty to a previous proceeding has asserted issue
preclusion against a defendant,” we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. See Jean Alexander Cosms., Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d
Cir. 2006). As the parties did not brief this issue, we assume without deciding the
standard of review is a fresh look. We affirm the District Court’s decision under either
standard of review.
3

(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the
later action; (2) there was a final adjudication on the merits; (3) the party
against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the
prior case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
prior proceeding; and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was
essential to the judgment.
Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 175 A.3d 239, 247 (Pa. 2017).
Here, we agree with the District Court that all the requirements for applying issue
preclusion are met. Each issue raised in Moffitt’s amended complaint was resolved by
the Pennsylvania court. See Moffitt, 192 A.3d at 1218 n.5 (“[N]o violation of his due
process rights occurred.”); id. at 1218 (“[W]e find no merit in Moffitt’s additional
arguments that the School District’s actions were an unlawful retaliation . . . .”); id. (“We
find no basis in the record to conclude that Moffitt’s employment was terminated for any
other reason than that enunciated by the School Board . . . , nor is there evidence that he
was discriminated against due to his alcoholism . . . .”). And, as the District Court
explained, all the other conditions are clearly met as well. See App. at 11a, Dist. Ct. Op.
at 8.
Moffitt argues that issue preclusion is inappropriate because he was required to
exhaust his state administrative remedies before filing a federal action. We disagree, as
he could have told the Commonwealth court he wanted to reserve litigation of his federal
claims, but he did not. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 419
(1964) (“[W]e see no reason why a party, after unreservedly litigating his federal claims
in the state courts[,] although not required to do so, should be allowed to ignore the
adverse state decision and start all over again in the District Court.”).
4

Moffitt also argues that the District Court should have converted the Appellees’
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. We see no indication that the
Court abused its discretion by declining to convert. See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d
1454, 1463 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992). It based its decision on the issue preclusion doctrine and
did not consider any facts introduced by the Appellees in their motion to dismiss. See
App. at 8a, Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.
*

*

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Moffitt’s
amended complaint.
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